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AARENDT’S REVOLUTIONARY ANTIQUITY
MIRIAM LEONARDINHERBOOKONREVOLUTION, published in 1963, the political theorist HannahArendt asks why revolution had become one of the dominant modes of polit-ical expression in the twentieth century. Arendt’s reﬂections on revolution
form an important counterpart and fascinating supplement to her more monu-
mental writings on twentieth-century despotism. In her magnum opus, The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism, Arendt would formulate a deeply pessimistic vision of
modernity.1 In exploring the rise of Hitler, she demonstrates how modern total-
itarian regimes have not just been political tyrannies; they have inﬁltrated the pri-
vate economic and cultural lives of their citizens and laid clam “to every corner of
human existence.” “Tolitarianism’s essence,” she asserts, “is the total domination
of human beings by the terror. [. . .] At their heart is the attempted extirpation of
all human ‘spontaneity,’ which is to say human freedom.”2 As Jonathan Schell
argues, “alongside this portrait of the political world,On Revolution seems to be-
long to another moral universe. [. . .] In place of the concentration camps, the his-
torical scene at the dead center of On Revolution is the Mayﬂower Compact.”3
Where the earlier book analyzed the suppression of freedom with forensic detail,
the later writings celebrate the project of human emancipation through action in
concert. The trajectory of Arendt’s thought is well illustrated by the opening pas-
sages of On Revolution:
Wars and revolutions—as though events had only hurried up to fulﬁl Lenin’s prediction—
have thus far determined the physiognomy of the twentieth century. And as distinguished
from the nineteenth-century ideologies—such as nationalism and internationalism, capitalism
and imperialism, socialism and communism, which, though still invoked by many as justify-
ing causes, have lost contact with the major realities of our world—war and revolutions still
constitute its two central political issues. They have outlived all ideological justiﬁcations. In a
constellation that poses the threat of total annihilation through war against the hope for the
emancipation of all mankind through revolution—leading one people after the other in quick
succession ‘to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which
the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them’—no cause is left but the most ancient
of all, the one, in fact, that from the beginning of our history has determined the very existence
of politics, the cause of freedom versus tyranny.4Classical Philology 113 (2018): 53–66
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1. Arendt 1976. My thanks to Bonnie Honig, Joshua Billings, and Constanze Güthenke for their comments
on this article, as well as my audiences at Oxford and Princeton.
2. Schell 2006, xiii.
3. Schell 2006, xiv.
4. Arendt 2006, 1.
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AOne of the most striking aspects of this opening is the complex temporalities that
Arendt sets in play. While she is ostensibly writing about the distinctiveness of
the “physiognomy of the twentieth century,” a number of other historical hori-
zons are brought into view. First the grand narratives of the nineteenth century,
narratives that she had examined at length in her genealogical investigation of
the origins of totalitarianism. While wars and revolutions persist, the nineteenth-
century ideologies that sustained them have seemingly been left behind. Despite
the apparent obsolescence of past ideological frameworks, it is Thomas Jefferson’s
late-eighteenth-century Declaration of Independence that is invoked as the man-
tra of the succession of peoples yearning for emancipation. But if the American
Revolution provides the script for the revolutions of the mid-twentieth century, it
is ultimately antiquity that makes political expression possible as such: “no cause
is left but the most ancient of all, the one, in fact, that from the beginning of our
history has determined the very existence of politics, the cause of freedom versus
tyranny.” For all the distinctiveness of the twentieth-century moment, for Arendt,
its events remain illegible without reference to “the most ancient of all” political
framings. The tripartite temporal reference that Arendt sets up in this opening par-
agraph recurs as a pattern throughoutOnRevolution. Antiquity, the late eighteenth
century, and the contemporary condition continuallymerge in her analysis. It is by
coming to terms with the notion of revolution that Arendt deﬁnes and reﬁnes her
concept of the political, a concept that emerges from the conﬂuence between an-
tiquity, the revolutions of the eighteenth century, and the democratic uprisings of
the twentieth century.
That Arendt connects revolution to the pursuit of freedom and that freedom is
associated by her with the “most ancient” understanding of the political may seem
unsurprising to us. But she is at pains to highlight the discrediting of freedom as
amotivation for political action in the analyses of her day. Freedomwaswhat she
called a “buried concept” in modern political thought:
Even the revolutionists, whom one might have assumed to be safely and even inexorably an-
chored in a tradition that could hardly be told, let alone made sense of without the notion of
freedom, would much rather degrade freedom to the rank of a lower-middle-class prejudice
than admit that the aim of revolution was, and always has been, freedom.5
This depreciation of freedom in modernity is seen by Arendt as a symptom of the
wider co-option of the political by what she will call “the social.” For Arendt,
the political realm, as such, has to be distinguished from the aspects of social life
that she aligns to the domestic sphere. This stark division is one of the most con-
troversial aspects of her thought and one that she develops extensively in her
philosophical-cum-political treatiseTheHumanCondition,written in1958 in the in-
terval between The Origins of Totalitarianism andOn Revolution.6 Arendt’s highly
exclusive understanding of what constitutes the domain of politics is outlined there
in terms that she derives from the Greek polis:
The distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to the household and
political realms, which have existed as distinct, separate entities at least since the rise of the5. Arendt 2006, 1.
6. On the controversy surrounding Arendt’s exclusion of the “social,” see most inﬂuentially Pitkin 1998.
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Aancient city state; but the emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public,
strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence
of the modern age and which found its political form in the nation-state.7
While the ancient Greek city upheld a rigid demarcation between the private and
the public, the oikos and the polis, Arendt sees the blurring of the two domains as
a distinctive quality of the modern nation. Her return to the Greek polis in this
passage is part of her wider privileging of ancient Athens as the birthplace of the
political. The Greeks, for Arendt, were the political actors par excellence and the
organization of the polis provides her with a blueprint for understanding what dis-
tinguishes politics as such from the spheres of economics and sociology. Given
the privileging of Athens as her model, it is not surprising that freedom plays
the decisive role in this delineation:
The realm of the polis [. . . .] was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship between
these two spheres, it was a matter of course that the mastering of the necessities of life in the
household was the condition for the freedom of the polis. [. . .] What all Greek philosophers,
no matter how opposed to polis life, took for granted is that freedom is exclusively located in
the political realm, that necessity is primarily a prepolitical phenomenon characteristic of the
private household organization, and that force and violence are justiﬁed in this sphere because
they are the only means to master necessity—for instance, by ruling over slaves—and to be-
come free.8
In Arendt’s mind, what deﬁnes the political is the space of freedom that is con-
stituted in such a way that it liberates its citizen participants from the constraints
of necessity. Turning one’s back on the domestic is a precondition of the entry
into politics. The oikos is governed by the inequalities, the struggles, and the en-
slavement—both literal and ﬁgurative—that make the freedom of the polis a pos-
sibility. So for Arendt there is no politics without freedom and no freedomwithout
the emancipation from the economic necessities that characterize the “social.”
This is why Arendt believes both freedom and politics have become devalued in
modern society. The political sphere has been confusedwith the economic sphere,
and rather than seeing freedom as the ultimate aim of political action, revolution-
aries and citizens have become increasingly vocal about preoccupations—such as
poverty—that are more properly understood as social.
Arendt’s motivation in addressing the topic of revolution can be understood in
part as an attempt to liberate it from Marxist analysis and the return to ancient
Greece is a central plank of this reevaluation.9 In On Revolution she argues that
Marxists have transformed the political concept of revolution into a social ques-
tion. In thewake ofMarx, writes Arendt, “revolutions had come under the sway of
the French Revolution in general and under the predominance of the social ques-
tion in particular.”10 It was in order to get beyond Marx and to reestablish the true
political meaning of revolution as the search for freedom that Arendt prioritizes
theAmerican over the French revolution in her book. Nevertheless, Arendt views
Marx himself—as opposed to his Marxist acolytes—as an ambivalent ﬁgure:7. Arendt 1998, 28.
8. Arendt 1998, 30–31.
9. See Wellmer (2000), who sees On Revolution as reckoning with the dual forces of liberalism and Marxism.
10. Arendt 2006, 51.
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AMarx’s place in the history of human freedom will always remain equivocal. It is true that
in his early works he spoke of the social question in political terms and interpreted the predic-
ament of poverty in categories of oppression and exploitation; yet it was also Marx who, in
almost all of his writings after the Communist Manifesto, redeﬁned the truly revolutionary
élan of his youth in economic terms. [. . .] And since he, unlike his predecessors in the modern
age but very much like his teachers in antiquity, equated necessity with the compelling urges
of the life processes, he ﬁnally strengthened more than anybody the politically most perni-
cious doctrine of the modern age, namely that life is the highest good, and that the life process
of society is the very centre of human endeavour. Thus the role of revolution was no longer to
liberate men from oppression of their fellow men, let alone to found freedom, but to liberate
the life process of society from the fetters of scarcity so that it could swell into a stream of
abundance. Not freedom but abundance became now the aim of revolution.11
While the early Marx had been able to transform the idea of poverty into a ques-
tion of political liberation, the laterMarx increasingly subordinated political to eco-
nomic concerns. Arendt suggests that the failure lies in Marx’s misreading of the
ancients who remained his teachers. As we saw above, ancient philosophers and
Aristotle in particular were alive to the role that necessity has played in the do-
mestic sphere. So Aristotle writes in Book 1 of the Politics:
The family is an association established by nature for the supply of everyday wants, and the
members of it are called by Charondas “companions of the cupboard,” and by Epimenides
the Cretan, “companions of the manger.” But when several families are united, and the asso-
ciation aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the ﬁrst society formed is the
village. [. . .] When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough
to be nearly quite self-sufﬁcing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of
life and continuing in existence for the sake of the good life.12
Aristotle tracks the development of the family to the state as a progressive eman-
cipation from the necessities of human life. The state, and the space of politics,
comes into existence when daily needs disappear from view. The move from the
oikos to the polis marks the transition from the “bare needs of life” to the “good
life.”Marx’s failure lay in his inability to see beyond the “bare needs of life” to-
ward the “good life.”Or rather it lay in foreclosing the domain of the good life by
orienting it toward the biopolitical instead. By prioritizing the life processes he
mistook economic for political ends and failed to understand Aristotle’s dictum
that “man is by nature a political animal.”
But if Arendt’s interest in revolution is motivated in part by a return to themost
ancient idea of freedom, Arendt is less convinced that revolution is itself an an-
cient idea. “Historically,” she writes “wars are among the oldest phenomena of the
recorded past while revolutions, properly speaking, did not exist prior to the mod-
ern age; they are amongst the most recent of all political data.”13 For although
Arendt recognizes the frequent changes that occurred within the political orders
of antiquity, she argues that the ancients lacked an understanding of what she calls
“the problem of beginning”:1411. Arendt 2006, 53–54.
12. Arist. Pol. 1.2.
13. Arendt 2006, 2.
14. Arendt 2006, 10.
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AModern revolutions have little in common with the mutatio rerum of Roman history or the
stasis, the civil strife which disturbed the Greek polis. We cannot equate them with Plato’s
metabolai, the quasi-natural transformation of one form of government into another, or with
Polybius’s politeiōn anakuklosis, the appointed recurring cycle into which human affairs are
bound by reason of their always being driven to extremes. Antiquity was well acquainted with
political change and the violence that went with change, but neither of them appeared to it to
bring about something new altogether. Changes did not interrupt the course of what the mod-
ern age has called history, which, far from starting with a new beginning, was seen as falling
back into a different stage of the cycle, prescribing a coursewhichwas preordained by the very
nature of human affairs and which therefore was unchangeable.15
In Book 8 of the Republic, for instance, Plato gives a dramatic account of a suc-
cession of political constitutions from aristocracy through timocracy, oligarchy
through democracy, and ﬁnally to tyranny. In these passages Plato describes polit-
ical change as the result of an overreach within a particular political systemwhich
almost inevitably precipitates a transition to a preexisting alternative order. Pace
the utopian dimension of the Republic itself, Plato’s schema in Book 8 does not
imagine the coming into existence of awholly new order. The ancients thus stayed
close to the etymological roots of the word revolution, seeing political change as
cyclical development rather than as inaugurating a previously unimagined social
organization.16 For Arendt this notion of “beginning”—which is rectilinear and
belongs therefore to a modern temporality—is particular to modern revolutions
and her deﬁnition of revolution makes it synonymous with this exclusively mod-
ern phenomenon or experience of the new.
Although, as we have seen, Arendt characterizes the twentieth century as “the
century of revolutions,” it is the dual legacy of the American and French revolu-
tions that are the central preoccupation in the book. (Rather infamously she has
no time for the Haitian revolution.) These eighteenth-century political crises re-
shaped the experience of history. Arendt establishes revolution as an inescapable
“metaphor” of the modern condition:
The modern concept of revolution, inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of
history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story never known or told before, is about
to unfold, was unknown prior to the two great revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.
Before they were engaged in what then turned out to be a revolution, none of the actors had the
slightest premonition of what the plot of the new drama was going to be. However, once the
revolutions had begun to run their course, and long before those who were involved in them
could know whether their enterprise would end in victory or disaster, the novelty of the story
and the innermost meaning of its plot became manifest to actors and spectators alike. [. . .] As
to the plot, it was unmistakably the emergence of freedom: in 1793, four years after the out-
break of the French Revolution, at a time when Robespierre could deﬁne his rule as the ‘des-
potism of liberty’without fear of being accused of speaking in paradoxes, Condorcet summed
up what everybody knew: ‘The word ‘“revolutionary” can be applied only to revolutions
whose aim is freedom.’1715. Arendt 2006, 11.
16. Arendt discusses the etymology of the word at 2006, 25–26 and 32–34.
17. Arendt 2006, 19.
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AThe establishment of a new calendar by the French Revolutionaries stands met-
onymically for the transformation of temporality enacted by these revolutions.18
The sense of “beginning anew” was intimately related to the quest for a new hu-
man narrative. The revolution created the possibility of composing a “new story”
which deviated from all preexisting emplotments.
But despite the potential afforded by this newnarrative freedom,Arendt encodes
the revolutionaries’ actions within a particular generic framework. As the revo-
lutionaries in Arendt’s text assume the role of actors, their revolution becomes a
drama. The theater of revolution transforms citizens into actors and witnesses
into spectators.19
Arendt’s turn of phrase in this passage is far from casual. In imagining the
FrenchRevolution as a drama, Arendt invokes the philosophy of the tragic and its
distinctive exploration of freedom and human agency.20 The philosophy of the
tragic not only seeks to thematize the perpetuity of the conﬂict between freedom
and necessity, it also casts us all as actors in and spectators of the drama that ensues.
Before she even invokes Robespierre’s “despotism of liberty” her own narrative
is framed by the poles of freedom and necessity. The same paradoxical relation-
ship between freedom and necessity, despotism and liberty, that forms the basis
of idealism’s analysis of tragedy seems to pervadeArendt’s description of the the-
ater of revolution. The plot that characterizes revolution is the same plot that struc-
tures tragedy. Robespierre’s “despotism of liberty” repeats the classic formulation
of Oedipus’ tragic dilemma formulated in Schelling’s reading of Sophocles’ play.
Oedipus, as Schelling demonstrated, was himself subject to a dictatorship of free-
dom: despite the fact that his actions were the product of necessity, he took re-
sponsibility for them as if they were an expression of his freedom—and it is this
self-conviction which amounts to his freedom. Arendt’s dramatic metaphor thus
not only recalls several contemporary or near-contemporary accounts of the French
Revolution—recall Marx’s discussion of the 1789/1848 revolutions as an alterna-
tion of tragedy and farce—it also deepens her own analysis of the key role that free-
dom (understood speciﬁcally, and increasingly under the pressure of the theater
metaphor, as the counter to necessity) plays in the modern experience and theori-
zation of revolution.
The explicit dialoguewithMarx, on the one hand, and the implicit engagement
with the philosophy of the tragic combine to make the dynamic of freedom and
necessity central to Arendt’s analysis of revolution. But the reason why Arendt
considers the American and French revolutions to be distinctive is that they com-
bine the pursuit of freedomwith striving after the wholly new. As Arendt phrases
it, “Crucial to any understanding of revolutions in the modern age is that the idea
of freedom and the experience of a new beginning should coincide.”21 In this
combination of freedom and novelty Arendt constructs a complicated ancient ge-
nealogy for revolution. For the sense of beginning that Arendt associates with the
eighteenth-century revolutionaries does not just run in parallel, it is itself struc-18. See Perovic 2015.
19. On the revolution as drama, see Comay 2011.
20. For Arendt on tragedy, see Pirro 2000 and Leonard 2015.
21. Arendt 2006, 24.
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Aturally related to the idea of freedom. And this idea of freedom, far from being
something wholly new, was in part nothing more than the recovery of an ancient
idea:
What the revolutions brought to the fore was this experience of being free, this was a new ex-
perience, not, to be sure, in the history of Western mankind—it was common enough in both
Greek and Roman antiquity—but with regard to the centuries that separate the downfall of
the Roman Empire from the rise of the modern age. And this relatively new experience, new
to those at any rate who made it, was at the same time, the experience of man’s faculty to begin
something new. These two things together—a new experience which revealed man’s capacity
for novelty—are at the root of the enormous pathos we ﬁnd in both the American and French
Revolutions, this ever-repeated insistence that nothing comparable in grandeur and signiﬁcance
had ever happened in the whole recorded history of mankind, and which, if we had to account
for it in terms of successful reclamation of civil rights, would sound entirely out of place. Only
where this pathos of novelty is present and where novelty is connected with the idea of freedom
are we entitled to speak of revolution.22
What is crucial to the eighteenth-century revolutionaries is that they experi-
enced freedom as something wholly new, as something unprecedented in human
history. The idea of freedom that they attempted to enshrine in their actions and
institutions could not be understood as a mere extension of “civil rights” which
previous political movements had vindicated. And yet, as Arendt points out, the
experience of freedom they advocated “was common enough in Greek and Ro-
man antiquity.”Arendt’s equivocation over the novelty of the revolutionary expe-
rience recallsMarx’s characterization of the French Revolution. In the Eighteenth
Brumaire, he famously formulates the role of Rome in the French Revolution as
an instance of history repeating itself:
Men make their own history but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under
self-selected circumstances but under circumstances existing, given from the past. Tradition
from all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And it is just
when they appear to be revolutionising themselves and their circumstances, in creating some-
thing unprecedented, it is in just such epochs of revolutionary crisis, that they nervously sum-
mon up the spirits of the past, borrowing from them their names, marching orders, uniforms, in
order to enact new scenes in world history.23
Contra Arendt, Marx presents the idea of an unprecendented revolution as an il-
lusion. There can never be such a thing as an “unprecedented” event.Marx seems
to be claiming the French Revolution was an event not despite but because of the
fact that it had a precedent. On the other hand, it could be argued thatMarx is pro-
claiming that the very innovation of the event is predicated on the return of some
“spirit of the past.” The “newness” of the French Revolution consists in its un-
timely reenaction of the “very ancient” in the “very modern.”24 Marx writes: “The
heroes as well as the parties and themasses of the old French Revolution achieved
in Roman costumes and with Roman phrases the task of their time.” The active
agents of the French revolution achieve the “task of their time.” “Men,” as Marx22. Arendt 2006, 24.
23. Marx 2002, 19–20.
24. To quote Derrida, see Kearney 1984, 112.
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Asays, “make their own history.” This is no regressive, nostalgic backward gaze,
but rather a progressive and active mobilization of the past in the present.
In fact, it is this very moment identiﬁed byMarx that Walter Benjamin elected
as the archetypal instance of what he called the Jetztzeit:
History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time ﬁlled
by the presence of the now. Thus, toRobespierre ancient Romewas a past chargedwith the time
of the nowwhich he blasts out of the continuum of history. The French Revolution saw itself as
Rome reincarnate.25
In his analysis of revolution Marx reveals how “Agents in the present are com-
pelled and yet simultaneously restricted, by the imagery and symbols of the past
when they come to fulﬁll some historic task”:26
Once the new social formation was established, the antediluvian colossi, and along with them
the resurrected Romans—the Brutuses, the Gracchuses, the Publicolas, the tribunes, the sena-
tors, Caesar himself—all vanished. [. . .] Wholly absorbed in the production of wealth and
peaceful competitive struggle, it could no longer comprehend that the spectres of Roman times
had kept watch over its cradle.27
As Derrida phrases it, “One has to forget the spectre and the parody, Marx seems
to be saying, for history to continue. But if one contents oneself with forgetting,
this becomes bourgeois platitude, life as usual. Onemust therefore not forget, one
must remember while forgetting enough, in this very memory, to ‘recover the
spirit of revolution not to relaunch its spectre.’”28 Marx seems to be suggesting
that the seeds of bourgeois self-satisfaction are both intrinsic and completely ex-
ternal to Rome. He implies that the reception of Rome is compelled to reinscribe
itself in an inexorable history of bourgeois ascendancy. And yet, it is precisely
by forgetting Rome that the French have precipitated this impasse: “In the strict
classical traditions of the Roman republic its gladiators found the ideals and art
forms, the self-deceptions that they needed, in order to hide from themselves the
constrained, bourgeois character of their struggles, and to keep themselves emo-
tionallyat the levelofhighhistorical tragedy.”29ForMarx,Rome isboth theprom-
ise of an ideal and ultimately a “self-deception.”But the responsibility of this self-
deception rests ultimately with its receivers.Marx leaves open the possibility that
Rome could be an ideal that precisely prevents a return to the same. In fact, if any-
thing could save the revolutionaries from this false consciousness it is the spectre
of Rome “watching over their cradle.”
InOnRevolution, Arendt also highlights this attachment to Roman concepts in
the French Revolution and she similarly associates it with its failures. She writes
of the “French hommes de lettres who were to make the revolution”:
They had no experience to fall back upon, only ideas and principles untested by reality to guide
and inspire them [. . .]. Hence they depended even more on memories from antiquity, and they
ﬁlled the ancient Roman words with suggestions that arose from language and literature rather25. Benjamin 1973, 263.
26. Cowley and Martin 2002, 5.
27. Marx 2002, 20.
28. Derrida 1994, 110.
29. Marx 2002, 20.
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Athan from experience. [. . .] However strongly the emotions of Robespierre and his colleagues
may have been swayed by experiences for which there were hardly any ancient precedents,
their conscious thoughts and words stubbornly return to Roman language. If we wish to draw
a line in purely linguistic terms, we might insist on the relatively late date of the word ‘democ-
racy’, which stresses the people’s role, as opposed to the word ‘republic’with its strong empha-
sis on objective institutions. And theword ‘democracy’was not used in France until 1794; even
the execution of the king was still accompanied by the shouts: Vive la république.30
Arendt, like Marx, sees the French revolutionaries’ reluctance to create their own
revolutionary language as a symptom of their inability to fully “make their own
history.”We can think here of Jacques-Louis David’s Roman pictures as the ulti-
mate ﬁguration of this tendency. SoDavid will depict the “Tennis Court Oath” us-
ing the visual vocabulary of the “Oath of the Horatii” just as the execution of the
king is ﬁgured in terms of Brutus’s tyrannicide.
But for Arendt, it is the revolutionaries’ incapacity tomove beyond the Roman
political vocabulary of republicanism toward the Greek language of freedom and
democracy that ultimately holds them back. Arendt andMarx, then, share an am-
bivalence about the role of antiquity in providing a model for the revolutionaries
of the eighteenth century. But where Marx’s equivocation highlights the incom-
pleteness of the model of emancipation inherited from the ancients, Arendt re-
mains committed to an ancientmodel of freedom. In fact,Arendt believes it is only
by returning to an ancient idea of freedom that revolution can emerge as a success-
ful political force inmodernity. Nevertheless, while she remains committed to that
ancient model, she does not advocate its restoration. She calls for a conceptual re-
turn, not one to be performed in practice. For Marx, by contrast, antiquity remains
an inadequate paradigm because the economic conditions of modernity require a
completely new model of political action:
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot take its poetry from the past but only
from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped away all superstition about
the past. The former revolutions required recollections of past world history in order to smother
their own content. The revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead in
order to arrive at its own content. There the phrase went beyond the content—here the content
goes beyond the phrase.31
Marx’s social revolution demands a new blueprint: it needs to treat the past as
dead in order to be able move beyond it. For all the power of its poetry, antiquity
remains nothing more than that, an ideological self-deception that prevents mod-
ern actors from confronting the reality of their material conditions. Arendt’s po-
litical revolution, by contrast, mandates a return to ancient notions of freedom to
emancipate its actors from the modern tyranny of the social. Nevertheless, as we
have seen, Arendt denies revolution to the ancients. While their understanding of
freedom remains unsurpassed, it is their capacity for “beginning” that she faults:
Only where change occurs in the sense of new beginning, where violence is used to constitute
an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic,
where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak30. Arendt 2006, 111–12.
31. Marx 2002, 21.
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Aof revolution. And the fact is that although history has known thosewho, likeAlcibiades, wanted
power for themselves or those who, like Catiline, were rerum novarum cupidi, eager for new
things, the revolutionary spirit of the last centuries, that is the eagerness to liberate and to build a
new house where freedom can dwell, is unprecedented and unequalled in all prior history.32
What is speciﬁc to modern revolution, then, is the two steps: violence against an
old order and commitment to house freedom in a new one. And this commitment
to freedom is speciﬁcally to an objective freedom. But in her insistence on the
modernity of revolution, Arendt is not motivated by a form of historicism. In-
deed, she has repeatedly been criticized for her unhistorical, not to say anachro-
nistic, engagement with antiquity. By denying revolution to antiquity, Arendt is
primarily making a theoretical rather than historical point. For her insight that the
Greeks lacked a sense of the new is linked to the articulation of a central concept
in her political thought: natality. The idea of natality ﬁnds its elaboration in The
HumanCondition. There Arendt associates the fact of being bornwith the human
capacity for action: “the new beginning inherent in birth canmake itself felt in the
world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something
anew, that is, of acting.”33 Indeed, this connection to action soonmakes natality a
sine qua non in Arendt’s political armoury: “Since action is the political activity
par excellence, natality, not mortality, may be the central category of the political,
as distinguished from metaphysical, thought.”34 Where mortality deﬁnes the
realm of metaphysics, natality delineates the sphere of political philosophy. Here
wemight detect a dialoguewithHeidegger—she is ceding his being toward death
to metaphysics and arguing that if it infects the political, that is an overreach with
damaging consequences.Within the context of her discussion of revolution, how-
ever, it is Arendt’s historical perspective on natality that is most pertinent. Natal-
ity is explored by Arendt not just as an ontological category but also as a potent
force within history:
The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, “natural” ruin is
ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is ontologically rooted. It is, in
other words, the birth of the new men and the new beginning, the action they are capable
of by virtue of being born. Only the full experience of this capacity can bestow upon human
affairs faith and hope, those two essential characteristics of human existence which Greek an-
tiquity ignored altogether, discounting the keeping of the faith as a very uncommon and not
too important virtue and counting hope among the evil illusions of Pandora’s box. It is the faith
in and hope for the world that found perhaps its most glorious and most succinct expression in
the few words with which the Gospels announced their “glad tidings”: “A child has been born
to us.”35
Although she may overstate her case, Arendt ﬁnds support for her idea that the
Greeks remained indifferent to novelty in orthodox accounts of classical schol-
arship. Armand D’Angour writes in the Greeks and the New: “Innovation is the
buzzword of modernity.”36 But, he asks:32. Arendt 2006, 25.
33. Arendt 1998, 9.
34. Arendt 1998, 9.
35. Arendt 1998, 247.
36. D’Angour 2011, 11.
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ACan we validly relate our own disparate experiences of the new to the experience of societies
and individuals in Greek antiquity? In marked contrast to the way the modern world is seen to
rely on and celebrate newness across so many areas of life, the ancient Greeks are commonly
characterised as having been unconcerned with and even averse to novelty. Propositions to the
effect that the Greeks “did not likely novelty” or “shunned the new” are widely found in stud-
ies of classical literature, history and thought.37
D’Angour speciﬁcally lays emphasis on the perception of the Greeks’ political
conservatism and the negative associations that political change held for many
Greek authors. The paradox is well expressed by Paul Cartledge:
On the one hand, there is easily detectable in much of Greek thinking, not only political, an
all-pervasive conservatism. Greeks often found or perceived themselves as being in the grip of
the past, with the linguistic consequence that political ideas which we might want to label pos-
itively as ‘revolution’, such as the invention of democracy, they would habitually and automat-
ically anathematise as ‘new’ or ‘newer things’, opposing them unfavourably to that which was
traditional (patrion) [. . .]. On the other hand, the Greeks did actually achieve revolutions, or
at any rate profound and lasting transformations in both their political practice and political
consciousness, something structurally far deeper and more permanent than is conveyed by the
terms metabole or metastasis (transformation) employed by the author of the ‘Constitution of
the Athenians’ attributed to Aristotle.38
It would be possible to detect beneath the Greek aversion to innovation a psycho-
logical attempt to deal with a society in crisis. We may not so much be looking at
a society in which innovation is unknown but rather at one in which the literate
elite—at least—do not appreciate the effects of the new. Nevertheless, even be-
yond the immediate political sphere, some Greeks could be seen to be enthralled
to an explicitly anti-natalist philosophy. D’Angour cites the surprisingly negative
connotations of birth in much of Greek thought, drawing on psychoanalysis to
explain how the “newborn infantmay be associatedwith trauma no less thanwith
pleasure.”39 The locus classicus of this anxiety is of course thewisdom of Silenus





ll use subNot to be born is best of all:
when life is there, the second best
to go whence you came,
with the best speed you may.Much beloved by Nietzsche, this passage gives us a profound insight into the
Greeks’ confrontation with the horrors of existence and the sense of apprehension
with which they faced the unknown. It is not difﬁcult to see why Arendt might
want to place this Weltanschauung at the opposite end of the spectrum from the
Christian “glad tidings”: “A child has been born to us.”Given her conviction that
natality remained anathema to the Greeks it is no coincidence that Arendt con-
cludes On Revolution by citing these very lines from Sophocles’ play.40 And yet,’Angour 2011, 11.
rtledge 1998, 381.
’Angour 2011, 136.
r a powerful reading of this same passage, see Euben 2003.
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Athere, as elsewhere in the book, it is the profound ambivalence of the Greek exam-
ple that she brings to the fore:





is not an ex
determinis
ll use subυ̃ναι τὸν ἅπαντα νικᾳ̃ λόγον: τὸ δ᾽, ἐπεὶ φανῃ̃,
κειθ̃εν ὅθεν περ ἥκει,
δεύτερον, ὡς τάχιστα.‘Not to be born prevails over all meaning uttered in words; by far the second-best for life, once
it has appeared, is to go as swiftly as possible whence it came.’ There he also lets us know,
through the mouth of Theseus, the legendary founder of Athens and hence her spokesman,
what it was that enabled ordinary men, young and old, to bear life’s burden: it was the polis,
the space of men’s free deeds and living words, which could endow life with splendour—τὸν
βίον λαμπρὸν ποεισ̃θαι.41
Arendt reveals how the very same poet in the very same play can simultaneously
voice the nihilism of Silenus and the utopianism of Theseus. Here the polis takes
the place later assigned to natality. The life-afﬁrming qualities of Theseus’ polis
are the antidote to the self-annihilating pessimism of Sophocles’ choral ode.More-
over, the polis as “a space of men’s free deeds” contrasts strikingly with the pas-
sivity and heavy predestination of Silenus’worldview. Arendt shows howGreece
may have misunderstood natality, but that does not mean that they devalued ac-
tion. In fact, in the polis they modeled a sphere of action on which all subsequent
ideas of the political rest. Arendt in the closing lines of On Revolution, then, I
think, returns to the questions that had animated her opening discussion. The di-
alectic between tyranny and freedomwithwhich she launches her book reemerges
as a theme in these closing pages. For Arendt associates the kind of fatalism ex-
pressed by Silenuswith the historical impasse that totalitarianismhad brought about
in the twentieth century. Totalitarianism emerges when human beings are forced
into isolation bymassive forces and then are convinced of the futility of action and
the enormity of the risks now associated with it. Depleted and deprived of the re-
ality normally secured for individuals by what Arendt calls the “in-between” and
what once was called the polis—the objective institutional terrain that separates
and unites people—, scared and isolated, they are incapable of action and most
also lose the bearings of their fragile moral compasses.42 Even within the overtly
philosophical and abstract argument of The Human Condition, Arendt appeals to
the concept of natality to overturn such a vision of human history:
We have seen before that to mortal beings this natural fatality, though it swings in itself and
may be eternal, can only spell doom. If it were true that fatality is the inalienablemark of histor-
ical processes, then it would indeed be equally true that everything done in history is doomed.
And to a certain extent this is true. If left to themselves, human affairs can only follow the law
of mortality, which is the most certain and only reliable law of a life spent between birth and
death. It is the faculty of action which interferes with this law because it interrupts the inexo-rendt 2006, 273; Soph. OC 1224–27, 1143–44.
is important to note that totalitarianism is like the inverse of action. It brings something new to the earth. It
pression of care for the earth, so it is not action, but it is newand it is creative. It is hope-killing, but it is not
tic; in fact, it is the effect of freely taken human actions and choices.
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Arable automatic course of daily life, which in its turn, as we saw, interrupted and interfered with
the cycle of the biological life process. The life span of man running toward death would in-
evitably carry everything human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of inter-
rupting and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present
reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin.43
Arendt found a hopeful response to the trauma of twentieth-century totalitarian-
ism in the democratic revolutions that slowly emerged in its wake. Europe seemed
to manage to turn its back on death and reorient itself toward life and new begin-
ning. Under the sway of the wisdom of Silenus, it is difﬁcult to image Arendt’s
Greeks abandoning their ﬁxation with mortality. But that is not to say that they
reconciled themselves either to futility or to determinism. NoGreek tragic protag-
onist, least of all Oedipus, was ever compelled by Silenus’ ode to choose inaction
over action. The Greeks’ comprehension of the fragility of human life arose out of
their acute awareness of changeablity. As Arendt formulates it in On Revolution:
That change presides over all things mortal was of course not a speciﬁcally Christian notion
but a prevalent mood throughout the last centuries of antiquity. As such, it had a greater af-
ﬁnity with classical Greek philosophical and even prephilosophical interpretations of human
affairs than with the classical spirit of the Roman res publica. In contradistinction to the Ro-
mans, the Greeks were convinced that the changeability, occurring in the realm of mortals in
so far as they weremortals, could not be altered because it was ultimately based on the fact that
neoi, the young, who at the same time were ‘new ones’ were constantly invading the stability
of the status quo. [. . .] The Roman feeling of continuity was unknown in Greece, where the
inherent changeability of all things mortal was experienced without mitigation or consolation.
[. . .] Human affairs changed constantly but never produced anything entirely new; if there ex-
isted anything new under the sun, then it was rather men themselves in so far as they were born
into the world.44
TheGreeksmay not have understood natality, but they understood instability, they
understood how youngmen, neoi, could interrupt the ﬂow of history through their
actions in concert in the polis. Nevertheless, they also understood the limitations
that were imposed on this freedom to act. Arendt is often accused of having an
idealized conception of Greek antiquity. Her championing of the Greek polis
as a space of political plurality has been criticized as yet another instance of a pe-
culiarly Germanic form of philhellenic nostalgia. But Arendt’s portrayal of the
ancients in On Revolution is more equivocal than this narrative would suggest.
In the end, the Greeks remain stuck somewhere between Silenus and Theseus.
Perhaps it is this double identity that makes them the best model for understand-
ing the alternating cycles of freedom and tyranny, revolution and totalitarianism,
that determined the physiognomy of the twentieth century.
University College London43. Arendt 1998, 246.
44. Arendt 2006, 18.
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